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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a decision of the Second Judicial District, Weber 
County, entered by the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, denying the City's motion to 
intervene in the Complaint and Appeal of a decision of the State Engineer concerning a 
water application that was filed by Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement District 
("Taylor-West Weber"). The Utah Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(f) (1953 as amended), transferred 
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(4) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Was the trial court correct in finding that Appellant, Roy City, lacks 
standing to participate in this matter as a party because it failed to comply with the legal 
requirements to become a party by filing a timely protest to Taylor-West Weber's 
appropriation application? 
Standard of Review of Issue 1. Standing is an issue of statutory interpretation, 
which the court review for correctness. Washington County Water Conservancy District 
v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, f 7, 82 P.3d 1125 (citing State v. Bohne, 2002 UT 116, ^ 4, 63 
P.3d63). 
4833-0520-9859.TA003 002 -1-
Issue 2. Was the trial court correct in determining that the Rules of Administrative 
Procedure and the rules adopted by the Division of Water Rights prohibit intervention in 
the Judicial Review of an order of the state engineer? 
Standard of Review for Issue 2. "The interpretation of a statute . . . presents a 
question of law[, which is] reviewed under a correctness standard." In re General 
Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, 110 P.3d 666 (citations 
omitted). 
Issue 3. Was it clearly erroneous for the court to have concluded, that by failing to 
file a timely protest to the application of Taylor-West Weber, Roy City failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies and is precluded from intervening in Taylor-West Weber's 
appeal of the decision of the State Engineer? 
Standard of Review for Issue 3. Statutory interpretation involving exhaustion of 
remedies is reviewed under a correctness standard. See Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Issue 4. Does prolonging the time required for a trial de novo review of the state 
engineer's decision, by asserting issues that are not disputed by the present parties, result 
in undue prejudice, where the proceedings must be completed with the statutory period? 
Standard of Review for Issue 4. Denial of permissive intervention is reviewed to 
determined whether the trial court abused its discretion. M&S Cox Investments, LLC v. 
Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315, % 20, 169 P.3d 789. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-202 in pertinent part: 
(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with 
the requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-103 in pertinent part: 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency action or proceeding 
described in Section 63G-4-102. 
* * * 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to 
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency 
rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-203(g) (2008), in pertinent part: 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of 
adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency 
shall, by rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings 
that include the following: 
* * * 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules 
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state 
permit intervention. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-401 in pertinent part: 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-402(2)(b) 
(2)(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-7(1) in pertinent part: 
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(1) Any person interested may file a protest with the state engineer: 
(a) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative 
proceeding is informal; and 
(b) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative 
proceeding is formal. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-14(l)(a): 
A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial 
review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures 
Act, and this section. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1(5) 
(5) The state engineer may make rules, in accordance with Title 63G, 
Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, consistent with the 
purposes and provisions of this title, governing: 
(a) water distribution systems and water commissioners; 
(b) water measurement and reporting; 
(c) ground-water recharge and recovery; 
(d) the determination of water rights; and 
(e) the form and content of applications and related documents, maps, and 
reports. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-1 
A. These rules establish and govern the administrative procedures for 
informal adjudicative proceedings before the Division of Water Rights as 
required by Section [63G-4-203]. 
B. These rules govern all informal adjudicative proceedings commenced on 
or after January 1, 1988. Adjudicative proceedings commenced prior to 
January 1, 1988, are governed by R655-2. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-2 
All adjudicative proceedings of the Division of Water Rights are hereby 
designated as informal proceedings and include, but are not limited to, all 
requests for agency action and notices of agency action concerning 
applications to appropriate water, change applications, exchange 
applications, applications to segregate; requests for reinstatement and 
extension of time; proofs of appropriation and change; applications for 
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extension of time within which to resume use of water and proofs of 
resumption of use; applications to renovate or replace existing wells; 
permits and authorizations for dam construction, repair and use; 
applications and other procedures for utilization of geothermal resources; 
licenses and other permits for water well drillers; applications for stream 
alteration; and other adjudicative proceedings involving water right 
administration. 
UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-3 in pertinent part: 
A. "Adjudicative Proceeding" means a Division action or proceeding that 
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal 
interests of one or more identifiable persons, including all Division actions 
to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend the 
authority, right, or license; and judicial review of all such actions. Those 
matters not governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b shall not be included within 
this definition. 
* * * 
F. "Party" means the Division or other person commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all persons permitted by the 
Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized 
by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
* * * 
K. "Protestant" means a person who timely protests an application before 
the State Engineer pursuant to Section 73-3-7 or who files a protest 
pursuant to Section 73-3-13. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-5 B.5.d. 
B. Proceedings Commenced by Persons Other Than the Division. 
* * * 
5. Protests filed pursuant to Title 73, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 shall be filed 
in accordance with the governing statutes and these rules. 
* * * 
d. Protests filed after the protest period has expired shall be placed on file 
and become part of the record. Any person filing a late protest is not a party 
and may receive notice of any further proceeding, hearing or order. 
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UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-8 
Intervention is prohibited except where a federal statute or rule requires that 
a state permit intervention. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-11 B 
Any person not a party to the adjudicative proceeding may participate at a 
hearing as a witness for a party or, upon the consent of the Presiding 
Officer, may participate as part of the Division's investigative and fact 
finding powers. Such a person is not a party to the adjudicative proceeding 
and may not seek judicial review. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Roy City appeals an order of the District Court Judge denying intervention in a 
trial de novo and appeal of an order of the State Engineer on an application appropriating 
certain water rights in Weber County. Plaintiff and Appellee, Taylor-West Weber Water 
Improvement District, filed an application for appropriation of water. (R. at 017-021.) 
Upon receiving the completed application, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Utah 
Code and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the state engineer set a deadline of 
March 9, 2005, for interested persons to file protests to the application. (R. at 005.) On 
September 21, 2005, a hearing was held on the application. (R. at 207.) It is undisputed 
that the state engineer followed proper procedures in publishing notice of the 
aforementioned deadline for protests and date of hearing. 
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On October 10, 2005, seven months after the deadline for protests and more than 
two weeks after the hearing on the application, the City submitted a letter to the State 
engineer protesting the application. (R. at 121-123, 182.) Pursuant to the administrative 
rules, the state engineer considered the content of the City's late protest and in his order 
referred to the late protest and provided appropriate protections to the City. (R. at 125-
128.) 
Taylor-West Weber formally requested that the state engineer reconsider the 
portion of the order that limited the appropriation of water to a period often years. (R. at 
035.) By rule, the request for reconsideration was denied by the failure of the state 
engineer to respond to the same within twenty days of the filing thereof. (R. at 007, Tf 30.) 
Taylor-West Weber then filed its Complaint and Request for Judicial Review of the order. 
(R. at 001-048.) Roy City moved to intervene in the appeal. (R. at 146-148.) After 
appropriate briefing and oral argument, the District Court Judge denied the motion on the 
basis that the City had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, i.e. a timely protest in 
the administrative proceedings, and lacked standing. (R. at 235-239.) In announcing her 
decision, the District Court Judge reasoned that "Roy City missed the deadline . . . it was 
a very, very late and untimely request to participate in the administrative process. Under 
the rules, they're not a party." (R. at 257:33.) "[A]s a non-party . . . and late protestant 
they don't have right to participate in the judicial review." Id. "To allow [the City] to go 
4833-0520-9859.TA003.002 -7-
through the back door when they couldn't go through the front door . . . just doesn't make 
any sense . . . ." Id. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
On or about January 14, 2005, Plaintiff submitted an application to the Utah State 
Engineer, seeking to appropriate a flow of 6.5 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water for 
municipal purposes from wells located within its service Area. (R. at 017-021.) Notice 
of Plaintiff s application to appropriate water was published in the Standard Examiner on 
February 10 and February 17, 2005. (R. at 207.) 
The deadline established by the State Engineer for the filing of protests against the 
Application was March 9, 2005. (R. at 094.) Protests filed after March 9, 2005 were not 
timely filed. (R. at 194.) The State Engineer held an informal adjudicative proceeding 
regarding Taylor-West Weber's Application on September 21, 2005. (R. at 207-210.) 
Roy City filed a written protest of the Application, dated October 10, 2005, and 
stamped "Received" by the Division of Water Rights, on October 13, 2005, more than 
seven months after the deadline for receiving protests had passed. (R. at 178-180.) 
On May 10, 2007, the State Engineer issued the order which approved Taylor-
West Weber's Application, but for a fixed time of "not to exceed ten years". (R. at 207-
210.) The Order of the State Engineer acknowledges receipt of the late protest by Roy 
City, but considered the City's concerns in the development of the Order. (R. at 207.) 
The Order of the State Engineer specifically states that: 
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a. the "approval is granted subject to prior rights" (R. at 210.); and 
b. the applicant shall be liable to mitigate or provide compensation for any 
impairment of or interference with prior rights as such may be stipulated 
among parties or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction. (Id.) 
On May 30, 2007, Taylor-West Weber timely filed a Request for Reconsideration 
of the Decision of the State Engineer. (R. at 212-216.) Taylor-West Weber's Request for 
Reconsideration was deemed denied when the State Engineer failed to respond to said 
request within twenty days of the filing thereof. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-302 (3)(b) 
(2008).1 
On July 19, 2007, within 30 days after the deemed denial of the request for 
reconsideration of the Decision rejecting the Application, Taylor-West Weber timely filed 
this action seeking judicial review. (R. at 001-048.) 
Defendant Weber Basin Water Conservancy District filed its answer to Taylor-
West Weber's complaint on August 23, 2007. (R. at 056-069.) Defendant Utah State 
Engineer filed its answer to Plaintiff complaint on August 31, 2007. (R. at 082-092.) 
Defendant United States Bureau of Reclamation filed a Special Appearance and 
Voluntary Motion to Dismiss on October 25, 2007. (R. at 093-094.) 
1
 In the 2008 General Session of the Utah Legislature, the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act was renumbered from Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. to § 63G-4-101 
et seq., which renumbering became effective after briefing and oral argument on the 
subject motion. For convenience, where the renumbering does not include changes to the 
language of the section, references citation shall be to the renumbered sections. 
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On January 11, 2008, Roy City filed its Motion to Intervene in this action, together 
with its supporting memorandum and proposed answer and counterclaim. (R. at 146-
189.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied Roy City's motion to intervene for lack of standing 
and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The legislature authorized the Division of 
Water Rights to enact rules governing the classification of proceedings and procedures to 
be followed in proceedings. Rules enacted by the Division of Water Rights have the 
effect of law. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-202 (2008). The applicable statutes and 
administrative rules establish simple requirements that a person must meet in order to 
become a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding on a water right's application. In 
order to become a party a person must file a protest within twenty (20) days after 
publication of the appropriate notice. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-7(l)(a). 
While to process to become a party at the appropriate time is simple, intervention 
in the proceedings, specifically including judicial review of an order of the State Engineer 
on an application for appropriation of water rights, is prohibited. "Any person not a 
party to the adjudicative proceeding may participate at a hearing as a witness for a party 
or, upon the consent of the Presiding Officer, may participate as part of the Division's 
investigative and fact finding powers. Such a person is not a party to the adjudicative 
proceeding and may not seek judicial review." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-11 B. (2007). 
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Roy City seeks to become a party in a proceeding notwithstanding its failure to follow the 
simple rules for becoming a party. In order to obtain judicial review person must have 
standing by being a party or by being granted standing under an independent statute. See 
In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545. Because Roy City was not a party in 
the proceedings before the State Engineer, it has no standing to obtain judicial review. 
Roy City acknowledges that it could not seek judicial review in this matter, (Brief 
of Roy City, at pages 12-13). In S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a person that did not file a protest in proceedings before the 
State Engineer did not exhaust administrative remedies and could not seek judicial 
review. By moving to intervene in the present case, Roy City seeks , in the words of the 
district court judge, ". . . to go through the back door when they couldn't go through the 
front door . . . ." (R. at 257:33.) 
Roy City attempts to distinguish S&G and other cases that uphold the exhaustion 
of remedies doctrine by asserting that it is not really seeking judicial review, but is merely 
seeking to participate in the judicial review that was sought by Taylor-West Weber. 
(Brief of Roy City, at pages 13-14.) However, by definition Roy City seeks judicial 
review where, by moving to intervene, it goes in search of, asks for and attempts to obtain 
judicial review, without exhausting its remedies. (See Dictionary.com Unabridged 
(v. 1.1), Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 
(2006)). 
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The district court correctly determined that because Roy City failed to file a timely 
protest, it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and lacks standing to intervene. 
(R. at 257:33.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. ROY CITY LACKS STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MATTER 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGAL 
REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME A PARTY BY FILING A TIMELY 
PROTEST TO TAYLOR-WEST WEBER'S APPROPRIATION 
APPLICATION. 
Roy claims that it may intervene in the judicial review of the State Engineer's 
decision under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it meets the requirements 
set forth in that Rule (Brief of Roy City, page 11). Roy's argument is based on the 
following logic: 
Judicial review of an informal proceeding is governed by the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention upon the conditions specified in 
Rule 24. 
Roy meets the requirements of Rule 24. 
Therefore, Roy argues, it should be permitted to intervene. 
Roy City argues that intervention is governed solely by Rule 24, of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (Brief of Roy City, at page 13). However, Roy City misconstrues the 
applicability of Rule 24 to judicial review of informal proceedings held under the Utah 
4833-0520-9859 TA003 002 -12-
Administrative Procedures Act. Roy City's logic is flawed because, in order to be 
allowed to intervene, before the Court even looks at Rule 24, Roy must demonstrate that 
it has standing to intervene. Standing is determined under the Administrative Procedures 
Act, which applies to judicial review by the district court. As will be shown, Roy lacks 
standing and it may not intervene. 
A. The District Court is Bound by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Utah Code Section 78A-5-102 confers jurisdiction on the various district courts in 
Utah. In Section 78A-5-102(7)(a), the legislature has provided that district courts have 
jurisdiction to review "agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63G, Chapter 
4, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, 
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings" (emphasis added). The Rules of 
Administrative Procedure " . . . establish and govern the administrative procedures for 
informal adjudicative proceedings before the Division of Water Rights . . . . " UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R655-6-1 (2007). In Viktron/Lika Utah, v. Labor Com X 2001 UT App 8, 
18 P.3d 519, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Judicial review of final agency actions is 
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Id. at 520 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l)(a) (Supp.2000) (stating UAPA governs judicial review of state 
agency actions). 
Consequently, the district court, sitting for a trial de novo, does not act in a 
vacuum, but is bound by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), as codified 
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in Title 63 G, Chapter 4, of the Utah Code. Therefore, Rule 24 and Roy City's right, if 
any, to intervene, must be examined through the lens of UAPA. 
B. ROY City Is Not a Party Under UAPA. 
UAPA defines those who are parties to administrative proceedings. Utah Code 
Section 63G-4-103 defines a "party" as: 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to 
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency 
rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
Under both this definition and the definition of a "party" under Utah 
Administrative Rule R655-6-3-F2, Roy City is not a party. The Administrative Rule is 
virtually identical to the statutory definition, the only difference being the addition of 
"protestant" to the list of persons who may be parties. However, Rule R655-6-3 K 
specifically excludes those who file late protests from the definition of a protestant. Roy 
admits that it filed its protest after the time for filing had expired ("Roy City filed a 
written protest of the Application on or about October 10, 2005, after the time for filing 
protests had expired." (Brief of Roy City, at page 7)). A person who files a late protest is 
not a party, though the person may participate in the adjudicative hearing. Utah 
Administrative Rule R655-6-5B.5.d. Consequently, Roy City is not a party by virtue of 
having filed a late protest. 
2
 The term "party" means ". . . the Division or other person commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all persons permitted by the Presiding Officer 
to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to 
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding." 
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Recognizing the importance of issues concerning water rights, the Rules provide 
ample opportunity for any interested person to participate in an informal adjudicative 
proceeding as a party. "Any person interested may file a protest with the state engineer: 
(a) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is 
informal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-7(1) (1953 as amended). By availing itself of this 
simple procedure an interested person becomes a party to the adjudicative proceedings 
involving the application at issue. The term party as defined in the Rules ". . . means the 
Division or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, ah 
protestants, all persons permitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, 
and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an 
adjudicative proceeding.55 UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-3 F. (2007) (emphasis added). 
The application to appropriate water that was filed by Plaintiff constitutes an adjudicative 
proceeding under the Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure. UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
R655-6-3 A. (2007). 
The adjudicative proceeding that is the subject of this action falls within the 
definition of an informal proceeding. "All adjudicative proceedings of the Division of 
Water Rights are hereby designated as informal proceedings and include, but are not 
limited to, all requests for agency action and notices of agency action concerning 
applications to appropriate water 55 UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-2 (2007). 
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Pursuant to the Rules as cited above, any person could become a party in the 
matter of the application to appropriate water that was filed by Taylor-West Weber. All 
that was necessary was to file a protest to the application within twenty days of the date 
that the Notice of the application was published. In fact, except for the State Engineer, 
each of the named defendants in the action became a party to these adjudicative 
proceedings by virtue of having followed that simple procedure. (R. at 002-003.) 
Although the Rules provide liberal opportunity for a person to become a party to 
adjudicative proceedings by simple filing a timely protest, they are also very specific that 
any person that files a late protest is not a party. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-5 B.5.d. 
(2007). 
In this case, Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement District filed its application 
to appropriate water on January 14, 2005. Notice of the application was published in the 
Standard Exatniner on February 10, 2005 and also on February 17, 2005. Roy City 
admits that it filed a protest on or about October 10, 2005. The City was entitled to, and 
could very easily have, become a party in the adjudicative proceedings by filing a protest 
on or before March 9, 2005. However, by failing to file until more than seven months 
after the statutory deadline, the City was designated by statute as a non-party in the 
adjudicative proceedings. 
C. As a Non-Party, Roy City Lacks Standing Before the District Court. 
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Rule R655-6-11 specifies certain rights and limitations of non-parties in 
adjudicative proceedings as follows: "Any person not a party to the adjudicative 
proceeding may participate at a hearing as a witness for a party or, upon the consent of 
the Presiding Officer, may participate as part of the Division's investigative and fact 
finding powers. Such a person is not a party to the adjudicative proceeding and may not 
seek judicial review." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-11 B. (2007). 
In In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545, the Supreme Court wrote: 
Generally, a party lacks appellate standing when the party is denied 
intervention in a proceeding and therefore is unable to participate below. 
This is a corollary to the exhaustion of remedies requirement that must be 
satisfied in order to appeal a Commission decision. In this case, however, 
our appellate standing analysis does not end with affirming the 
Commission's decision to deny Ball and Geddes intervention in the 
proceedings. Utah Code section 54-7-15 grants standing to certain classes 
of individuals to seek judicial review of Commission decisions regarding 
public utilities. Nevertheless, such individuals are not given standing to 
appeal any Commission decision, but must also be "aggrieved" or 
"substantially prejudiced" by that decision. Thus, we must now determine 
whether any individual petitioner in this case has appellate standing to seek 
judicial review of the Commission's orders. Id. at f^ 44. 
In the Questar case, the Supreme Court did not end its inquiry into whether the 
petitioners, Bell and Geddes, had standing after determining that they were not permitted 
to intervene at the lower level because of the existence of an independent statute, Utah 
Code § 54-7-15, that granted standing to certain classes of individuals. In the present 
case, no statute or rule permits Roy City to become a party, and no statute permits 
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intervention. Indeed, Utah Code § 63G-4-203(g)3 expressly forbids intervention in an 
informal adjudicative proceeding such as that before the State Engineer. 
The Questar case stands for the proposition that, in order to be permitted to 
intervene, a person must have standing and must also be aggrieved. This is in keeping 
with the requirements of Utah Code § 63G-4-401: "(1) A party aggrieved may obtain 
judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly 
prohibited by statute." 
Section 63G-4-401(l) mandates that in order to obtain judicial review, a person 
must both be a party (have standing) and be aggrieved. Because UAPA defines a party in 
section 63G-4-103, the use of the word "party" in section 63G-4-401 must be read to 
mean an entity meeting that definition of a party. Because Roy City is admittedly not a 
party, it may not obtain judicial review. Roy City has made an argument that though it is 
not able to seek judicial review by filing a petition for review, it may nevertheless 
participate in the judicial review by way of intervention (Brief of Roy City at page 12): 
"A late protestant such as Roy City is not barred from intervening in a proceeding for 
judicial review where, as in the present case, the intervenor is not seeking to commence 
the judicial review". Again, at page 13, Roy City argues: "[T]his Court should order the 
trial court to allow Roy City to intervene in this action under Rule 24 because Roy City is 
3
 "(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules permitting 
intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention." Utah 
Code § 63G-4-203(g). 
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not 'seeking' judicial review of the State Engineer's Order but is instead only seeking to 
participate... ."). As section 63G-4-401 states, a party may not obtain judicial review 
unless it is an aggrieved party. Because Roy City is not a party, it may not obtain judicial 
review, either by seeking it as a petitioner or participating in the review as an intervenor. 
Roy City attempts to show that it has standing by arguing that it is aggrieved (Brief 
of Roy City at pages 15-18). However, as both the Questar case and Section 63G-4-401 
point out, simply being aggrieved is insufficient. A person must also have standing by 
being a party or by being granted standing under an independent statute. 
Roy City argues that Utah Code section 73-3-14(l)(a) permits ^person aggrieved 
by a decision of the State Engineer to obtain judicial review (Brief of Roy City, page 15). 
That section in its entirety reads: "(l)(a) A person aggrieved by an order of the state 
engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section" (emphasis added). 
In order to take advantage of section 73-3-14(l)(a), Roy City must proceed in 
accordance with the UAPA, which includes being a party or otherwise establishing that it 
has standing. Then and only then may it proceed to demonstrate that it is aggrieved. 
Because Roy City cannot show that it has standing, the Court need not consider whether 
or not Roy is aggrieved; Roy may not obtain judicial review. 
Judicial review of the State Engineer's decision is governed by UAPA. The 
district court must consider the provisions of UAPA in deciding whether to permit 
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intervention by Roy City. UAPA clearly defines who is a party to an adjudicative 
proceeding and prohibits intervention in informal proceedings. Because Roy City is not a 
party as defined under UAPA, Roy lacks standing before the district court and the district 
court properly denied Roy City's motion for leave to intervene. 
II. THE MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE 
THE UTAH RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND THE 
RULES ADOPTED BY THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS APPLY TO 
THIS MATTER AND SPECIFICALLY PROHIBIT INTERVENTION. 
The Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure ("the Rules") specifically prohibit the 
intervention of Roy City in this matter. Roy City bases its argument in favor of allowing 
intervention in this matter on Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but ignores 
the specific Utah administrative rules that apply. In section 73-2-1(5), the legislature 
authorized "The state engineer [to] make rules, . . . governing . . . the determination of 
water rights." Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-202, the rules adopted by the State 
Engineer have the effect of law: "An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in 
accordance with the requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-202(2) (2008). The ruling of the district court should be 
affirmed because intervention is specifically prohibited in the judicial review of an order 
of the State Engineer granting an appropriation application. 
A. The Rules of Administrative Procedure Prohibit Intervention In The Judicial 
Review Of An Informal Administrative Proceeding. 
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Although Roy City now seeks to intervene in the judicial review, it is clear that the 
right to intervene is proscribed by the UAPA and it could not have intervened at the 
adjudicative proceeding level. Section 63G-4-203(g) states with respect to informal 
proceedings: "Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules 
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit 
intervention." Consequently, Roy City cannot claim to be a party by virtue of 
intervention at the agency level, either. 
Roy City does not meet the other definitions of a party given in either Section 
63G-4-103 or R655-6-3-F. It is not the agency or other person commencing the 
adjudicative proceeding and there is simply no statute or agency rule that allows it to 
become a party. Therefore, Roy City was not a party to the adjudicative proceeding, nor 
is it a party to the judicial review in the district court. Roy City admits this (Brief of Roy 
City, page 10): "[I]t is true that Roy City filed a late protest and thus was not a 'party' to 
the adjudicative proceeding before the State Engineer by virtue of being a 
'protestant'. . . . " 
Pursuant to the authority granted to state agencies to enact rules ". . . designating 
categories of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted informally," UTAH CODE ANN. § 
63G-4-202 (2008), the Division of Water Rights enacted Rule R655-6, which designates 
all adjudicative proceedings of the Division of Water Rights, including applications to 
appropriate water and judicial review of those decisions, as informal proceedings. UTAH 
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ADMIN. CODE R655-6-2 (2007). Under the Rules of Administrative Procedure, the term 
"Adjudicative Proceeding" includes judicial review of an order on an application to 
appropriate water rights. "'Adjudicative Proceeding' means a Division action or 
proceeding that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal 
interests of one or more identifiable persons . . . including . . . judicial review of all such 
actions." UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-3A (2007) (emphasis added). 
Rule R655-6-2 specifically includes: " . . . applications to appropriate water . . . . " , 
as adjudicative proceedings. UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-2 (2007). Therefore, the 
Rules of Administrative Procedure apply to judicial review of an order on an application 
to appropriate water rights. The action filed by Taylor-West Weber in this matter 
constitutes judicial review of the order of the State Engineer. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines Judicial Review as follows: "Judicial review, Form of appeal from an 
administrative body to the courts for review of either the findings of fact, or of law, or of 
both. See also Appeal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 442 (5th ed. 1983). 
In this case, the City seeks to intervene in an appeal from an order of the State 
Engineer to the District Court. An appeal from the order of the State Engineer is an 
appeal from an administrative body to the courts and as such is included in the definition 
of judicial review and is therefore, an adjudicative proceeding to which the Rules of 
Administrative Procedure apply. 
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Rule R655-6-8 of the Rules of Administrative Procedure provides: "Intervention 
[in an informal adjudicative proceeding] is prohibited except where a federal statute or 
rule requires that a state permit intervention." UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-8 (2007). 
This prohibition is explicit and mirrors the language of the corresponding provision of the 
Utah Code. "Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules permitting 
intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-203(g) (2008). 
Therefore, unless a specific federal or state law requires, and the City has failed to 
identify any such law, intervention by the City in the application of Taylor-West Weber 
Water Improvement District is prohibited because: (a) Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Administrative Appeal before the District Court is an informal adjudicative proceeding 
for purposes of the application of the Rules of Administrative Procedure; and (b) 
Intervention is prohibited in informal adjudicative proceedings. 
B. The Specific Rules Prohibiting Intervention Take Precedence Over the General 
Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Intervention. 
The City argues that because a statute, section 63G-4-402(2)(b), states: "All 
additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure," and Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for 
intervention if certain circumstances apply, the provisions of the Administrative Code 
prohibiting intervention in the judicial review of a decision of the State Engineer are 
inapplicable. (Brief of Roy City at 18-19). However, that argument is misplaced. 
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Both provisions are based on statutory authority. Section 63G-4-402(2)(b), of the 
Administrative Code provides for the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
section 63G-4-203(g) states that intervention in an informal adjudicative proceeding is 
prohibited. In determining which provision applies to a specific circumstance, the Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently held that pursuant to the rules of statutory construction 
specific statutory provisions take precedence over general statutory provisions. See eg.; 
Cathco v. Valentiner Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365 (Utah 1997); Jensen 
v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). 
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure apply generally to the proceedings in an 
appeal of an order of the state engineer, that general applicability does not make the 
specific rules prohibiting intervention inapplicable. 
C. Recently Amended Section 73-3-14 Demonstrates Legislative Intent to 
Preclude Intervention By Persons That Did Not File A Timely Protest To An 
Appropriation Application. 
During its 2008 General Session, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-14 concerning the parties to be named in the appeal of a decision of the State 
Engineer, and in so doing implied that late protestants are not included in the group of 
potential intervenors in the action. Prior to the amendment, a party appealing an order of 
the State Engineer was required to ". . . name the agency and all other appropriate parties 
as respondents " UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14 (2004) (Renumbered as § 63G-4-
401 by Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1391, eff. May 5, 2008). Prior to 2008, section 73-3-14(2) 
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read: "The state engineer shall be joined as a defendant in all suits to review his decisions, 
but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation may be rendered against him. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-14(2) (2004). Amended section 73-3-14(7) states: "A person 
who files a petition for judicial review is not required to: (a) notwithstanding Subsection 
63G-4-401(3)(b), name a respondent that is not required by this section; and (b) 
notwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-402 (2)(a)(iv), identify all parties to the adjudicative 
proceeding. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-14(7) (2008). 
The effect of amended Subsection 73-3-14(7) is that those persons who were 
required to be named as respondents due to their filing timely protests, now need not be 
named. Instead, the code provides: "A person who files a petition for judicial review as 
authorized in this section shall: (a) name the state engineer as a respondent; and (b) 
provide written notice in accordance with Subsection (5) to each person who filed a 
protest in accordance with Section 73-3-7 of: (i) the filing of the petition for judicial 
review; and (ii) the opportunity to intervene in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 24." UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-14(3) (2008). 
Notwithstanding Roy City's assertion that amended section 73-3-14 supports its 
position on intervention, (Brief of Roy City, p. 19 fn 9), the amendment in fact suggests 
that late protestants have no right to intervene. The required notice of the right to 
intervene is sent only to those who filed timely protests. In quoting the language of the 
amended statute, Roy City omits the critical and operable language ". . . in accordance 
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with Section 73-3-7." Nothing in section 73-3-7 applies to late protests and nowhere in 
the code is notice of intervention rights required to be sent to persons who filed late 
protests. Considering the detail with which the administrative rules deal with late 
protests, the legislature certainly could have included persons who filed late protests in 
the group for whom notice of intervention rights is required, if it intended that such rights 
existed. 
III. BY FAILING TO FILE A TIMELY PROTEST, ROY CITY FAILED TO 
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND IS PROHIBITED FROM 
SEEKING OR INTERVENING IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE 
ORDER OF THE STATE ENGINEER. 
A. By Failing To Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Roy City Forfeited Any 
Right to Participate As A Party In The Judicial Review Of the State Engineer's Decision. 
UAPA requires generally that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to 
judicial review. 
A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies available, except that: (a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states 
that exhaustion is not required; (b) the court may relieve a party seeking 
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative 
remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii) 
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to 
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-401(l)-(2) (2008). 
Although Roy City failed to file a timely protest, it now seeks to circumvent the 
rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies by intervening in the judicial review. 
"The fact that the remedy is no longer available does not, of course, alter application of 
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the doctrine, as to hold otherwise would obviously permit circumvention of the entire 
judicial policy behind the doctrine. Roth v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.3d 679, 687, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 163, 168 (Cal.App. 1975) (citations omitted). The Roth case recognizes the 
mischief that can be done by allowing a person to appeal to the courts after failing to 
participate in the administrative proceeding below. Roy claims that it did participate, by 
way of a late filed protest. (Brief of Roy City, at page 15.) However, the late protest did 
not constitute exhaustion of remedies. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that participation in the administrative 
proceedings is a prerequisite to judicial review. In S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 
(Utah 1990), a seller of water rights who did not file a protest or otherwise participate in 
the hearing that was held on the buyer's proposed change application sought judicial 
review. Notwithstanding the provision that any person aggrieved could seek judicial 
review, the Utah Supreme Court held that the seller "waived its right to judicial review by 
failing to participate in the administrative proceedings." The Court also emphasized: 
"The requirement of participation as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of 
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies." Id. at 1087. 
While acknowledging that it could not seek judicial review in this matter, (Brief of 
Roy City, at pages 12-13) Roy City attempts to distinguish S&G and other cases that 
uphold the exhaustion of remedies doctrine by asserting that it is not really seeking 
judicial review, but is merely seeking to participate in the judicial review that was sought 
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by Taylor-West Weber. (Brief of Roy City, at pages 13-14.) The City cites Utah 
Assoc 'n of Counties v. Tax Commission, 895 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995) as authority for its 
position that seeking judicial review is restricted to commencing or initiating judicial 
review. While Utah Assoc yn of Counties states that "[t]he right of a party to intervene in 
an administrative hearing is different from standing to obtain judicial review", it was also 
critical to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in that case that the Utah Association of 
Counties had in fact satisfied the requirement of at least de facto intervention in the 
administrative proceedings before seeking review. Id, at 820. The definition of the word 
seek is not limited to commence or initiate. Random House dictionary defines Seek as 
follows: 
1. to go in search or quest of: to seek the truth. 
2. To try to find or discover by searching or questioning: to seek the 
solution to a problem. 
3. To try to obtain: to seek fame. 
4. To try or attempt (usually fol. By an infinitive): to seek to convince a 
person. 
5. To go to: to seek a place to rest. 
6. To ask for; request: to seek advice. 
7. Archaic. To search or explore. 
- verb (used without object) 
8. To make inquiry. 
-Idiom 
9. Be sought after, to be desired or in demand: Graduates in the physical 
sciences are most sought after by employers these days. 
Dictionary.com Unabridged (v. 1.1), Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 
Random House, Inc. (2006). Moving to participate as a party in an action that is filed fits 
squarely with the above definition. Roy City is in search of, asking for and attempting to 
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obtain judicial review through intervention, without first exhausting its remedies. In State 
Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575 (Utah 1940), the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of exhaustion of remedies: "The omission of an imposed duty 
designed to advise and administrative body of an event which sets its process in motion, 
should not accrue to the advantage of the one who failed in the duty. This turns a delict 
into a triumph." Id. at 578. 
Intervention has also been held to be unavailable in cases involving Social Security 
and Medicare benefits. "While a person seeking to intervene as a party plaintiff is subject 
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, such requirement may be 
waived as to an intervenor where exhaustion would be futile." 30 Fed. Proc, L. Ed. § 
71:617 (September 2008) (citing Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D. N.Y. 1989)). 
Despite reasonable efforts in researching this issue, Taylor-West Weber has been 
unable to discover any Utah appellate case wherein a person failed to file a timely protest 
to a decision of the State Engineer and then moved to intervene in the judicial review of 
the decision. However, in City of Port Arthur, v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 
13 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), the Texas Court of Appeals considered a matter 
similar to the present case. In Port Arthur, "Southwestern Bell Company (SWB) filed an 
application for rate group reclassification with the Public Utility Commission (the 
Commission)." Id. at 843. The City did not participate in the administrative proceeding, 
but later moved " . . . to intervene and requested reconsideration of the Commission's 
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decision." Id. When the Commission, by inaction, overruled the City's request, the City 
failed to request a motion for rehearing. Id. 
When SWB then filed for judicial review of the Commission's decision in the 
district court, " . . . the City filed a petition in intervention in the district court review 
proceeding." Id. The district court denied the motion to intervene and the City appealed. 
The Texas Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he City did not participate in the administrative 
hearing in any capacity before the Commission issued its decision and did not obtain 
permission to intervene in the administrative proceeding; the City therefore, was not a 
party to the proceeding and does not have a statutory right to judicial review of the 
Commission's decision." Id. at 844. Moreover, the Texas Court of Appeals determined: 
The City cites this Court to no authority entitling one to intervene in a 
district court suit for judicial review of an agency's decision concerning an 
administrative proceeding to which it was not a party. Thus, it has failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in striking the City's 
plea in intervention. 
Id. The same statement should apply to the present case. 
The rules that have been adopted by the Utah State Engineer promote this same 
principle. In § 73-2-1(5), the legislature authorized "The state engineer [to] make rules,. 
. . governing . . . the determination of water rights." Those jurisdictional rules are very 
liberal in allowing the participation of interested persons in proceedings regarding water 
rights applications, but Rule R655-6-11 B is very clear: "A non-party to the adjudicative 
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proceeding may not seek judicial review." That opportunity is lost by failure to act at the 
proper time. 
In this case, by missing the deadline by 7 months, the City lost its opportunity for 
jurisdiction or standing in these proceedings. It now asks the Court to create jurisdiction 
or standing in the Plaintiffs appeal of the State Engineer's order. Nothing in the City's 
memorandum or reply establishes a right to be included as a party in these proceedings. 
B. Cases Cited By the City do Not Support A Right To Intervene in An Appeal of 
An Order of the State Engineer. 
This matter is distinguished from other cases wherein intervention was permitted 
based on Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter constitutes judicial 
review and an administrative appeal of the order and judgment of the Utah State Engineer 
on the application to appropriate water rights that was filed by District. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Rule 24 did govern the present case, Plaintiff would 
assert that intervention was not warranted because the City's participation at this point is 
untimely. In Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah 
Court of Appeals denied the motion of an entity to intervene in a matter for the first time 
on appeal. "Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may 
intervene under proper circumstances. However, the rule contemplates timely 
intervention at the trial court and not for the first time on appeal." Id. at 501 (emphasis 
added). 
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Moreover, Envirotech noted that "postjudgment intervention even in the trial court 
is generally not permitted." Id. Envirotech cites the decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
in Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983), holding that" . . . 
postjudgment intervention should be allowed only upon a strong showing of entitlement 
and justification, or such unusual circumstances justifying the failure to seek intervention 
earlier." Id. (citing Jenner at 1074). 
In this case, the district court is a reviewing court. A decision was already entered 
by the State Engineer in the proceedings below. Roy City had ample time and 
opportunity to become involved in these proceedings as a party. All that was required 
was a timely protest. The City does not present that "strong showing of entitlement and 
justification" that was required in Jenner. Neither are there any "unusual circumstances 
justifying the failure to seek intervention [or participation] earlier." Id. The City simply 
failed to get involved at the appropriate time and now seeks to re-open matters that have 
already been determined by the State Engineer. (R. at 101-145.) Accordingly, even if 
intervention in an administrative appeal was not prohibited by rule, denial of the City's 
motion would still be appropriate. 
IV. INTERVENTION OF ROY CITY WOULD UNDULY PREJUDICE 
PLAINTIFF IN THIS MATTER. 
Taylor-West Weber would be unduly prejudiced by allowing the intervention of 
Roy City in this matter in large part because of the severe time constraints imposed by the 
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legislature in proceedings of this nature. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-15 (1953 as amended), 
requires that this matter be completed within 2 years after the filing of the Complaint: 
(1) An action to review a decision of the state engineer from an informal 
adjudicative proceeding may be dismissed upon the application of any of 
the parties upon the grounds provided in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the dismissal of actions generally and for failure to prosecute 
such action with diligence. 
(2) (a) For the purpose of this section, failure to prosecute a suit to final 
judgment within two years after it is filed, or, if an appeal is taken from a 
district court judgment within three years after the filing of the suit, 
constitutes lack of diligence. 
(b) A court shall dismiss those suits after ten days' notice by regular mail to 
the plaintiff. 
This requirement has been strictly enforced by Utah appellate courts. In Jensen v. 
Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue as 
follows: "We recently held that under section 73-3-15, when a party fails to take all 
reasonable steps to secure a timely trial setting, the action should be dismissed. Id. at 292 
(citing Blake v. Morgan, 782 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1989)). 
Contrary to the assertion of Roy City, this matter when considered in its entirety, is 
not in its infancy. (See R. at 153.) Plaintiffs application to appropriate water was 
submitted to the State Engineer more than three years ago. A hearing was held and the 
matter was under consideration for more than two years before the State Engineer issued 
his Order. None of the Defendants in this matter chose to appeal the decision. In 
response to Taylor-West Weber's Complaint and Administrative Appeal, one of the 
Defendants, the United State Bureau of Reclamation, sought and was granted voluntary 
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dismissal as a Defendant. Of the two remaining Defendants that filed answers, neither 
has filed a counterclaim. 
Although the district court is required to review the bases for the decision of the 
State Engineer, see East Bench Irr. Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603 (Utah 1956); Shields v. Dry 
Creek Irr. Co., 363 P.2d 82 (Utah 1961), based on Taylor-West Weber's Complaint and 
Administrative Appeal and the answers filed by the two Defendants the only issue that 
appears to be contested by the proper parties is the permissibility of that portion of the 
State Engineer's Order that limits his approval to a term often years. Roy City now asks 
this Court to allow it to not only contest additional matters, but also to litigate a counter-
claim, which would certainly require a substantially longer period of time for discovery, 
briefing and argument than the much more narrow issue that is now before this Court. 
As a supplier of culinary water, Plaintiff is in need of the appropriated water at 
this time. Each extension of time before the water can be put to beneficial use serves to 
prejudices not only the Plaintiff and its customers, but also the policy of the State of Utah 
that all water be put to beneficial use. See In re General Determination of Rights to Use 
All of Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake and 
Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, and Juab Counties, 
2004UT67,98P.3dl. 
Moreover, the interests of Roy City were already considered by the State Engineer 
and its interests are protected by the provisions of the Order. The State Engineer is 
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required to consider protests in approving or rejecting applications. UTAH CODE ANN. § 
73-3-7(2) (1953 as amended). Pursuant to the Order, Plaintiffs rights to the water are 
subordinate to all senior rights and Plaintiff is ". . . liable to mitigate or provide 
compensation for any impairment of or interference with prior rights as such may by 
stipulated among parties or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction." (R. at 127.) 
Because the rights of the Plaintiff will be substantially prejudiced by permitting 
intervention and litigation of issues already resolved, and because the rights of Roy City 
were considered and are protected by the terms of the Order, the motion to intervene 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The order entered May 5, 2008 by the Second Judicial District Court is correct. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to affirm the same. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2008. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Mark H. Anderson 
Brett B.Rich 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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